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Abstract
This article examines the labour market outcomes of immigrants in Spain, a country that has become a migration desti-
nation only since the end of the 1990s. Differentiating between first and second generation of immigrant descent, we
compare the labour market involvement of the main ethnic groups with the majority group. One particular focus is to un-
derstand which minorities have been hit the hardest by the Great Recession. To this end, we use data from the European
Union Labour Force Survey for the years 2008 and 2014, and more specifically the two ad-hoc modules on the labour mar-
ket situation of migrants. Analysing men and women separately, we run a set of multivariate logistic regression models to
control for compositional differences. In this way, we examine ethnic gaps not only in labour force participation but also
in the degree of underutilisation of human capital, measured as workers’ level of over-education as well as the incidence
of involuntary part-time employment. Our results show that while most origin groups do not show significantly lower em-
ployment participation than the majority group, the employment quality of immigrants in terms of involuntary part-time
work and over-education is substantially worse, especially since the crisis.
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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, Spain has received an un-
precedented inflow of migrants, particularly from Latin
America and Eastern Europe. However, the existing ev-
idence on the labour market integration of these mi-
grants, and especially the economic well-being of their
descendants, is still limited. Moreover, the Great Reces-
sion brought a sudden and profound change to peo-
ple’s economic circumstances,which calls for an updated
analysis of immigrants’ situation. This article examines
how the main origin groups fare in the labour market
in comparison to the majority group and to each other.
Using data from two special modules of the European
Union Labour Force Survey (Eurostat, 2018), we show
descriptive evidence about ethnic gaps in the Spanish
labour market. We then use multivariate statistical anal-
yses to find out to what extent these changing gaps
are attributable to different socio-demographic char-
acteristics. All analyses in this article are carried out
for men and women separately and we distinguish be-
tween the first and second generation. In examining
data from 2008 and 2014 respectively, we compare im-
migrants’ economic performance before and after the
Great Recession that shook the Spanish labour market
to its foundations.
We focus on three outcome measures: (1) partici-
pation in paid employment, (2) in involuntary part-time
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work, and (3) level of over-education.1 Together with
earnings, having a paid job is the standard measure of
economic incorporation. Being part of the workforce is
essential to social integration and the prime source of in-
come for most immigrants and the majority group. How-
ever, as argued in the introduction to this thematic issue,
the themes of economic integration and returns to hu-
man capital have beendiscussed to understand the socio-
economic situation of immigrants. In this regard, we also
consider measures of employment quality that speak to
the degree of integration of immigrants beyond the min-
imum threshold of holding a paid job.
In this vein, the second labourmarket outcome exam-
ined in this article is involuntary part-time work, that is,
working under a part-time contract due to the impossibil-
ity of finding a full-time job. It is crucial to acknowledge
the duality among part-time workers by distinguishing
those who are voluntary part-timers from those who are
involuntary because they could not find a full-time job. In
fact, involuntary part-timers perceive the quality of their
job to be lower (Kauhanen & Nätti, 2015), and they are
also more likely to experience depression and low self-
esteem (Dooley, Prause, & Ham-Rowbottom, 2000) than
those working in a voluntary employment arrangement.
In Spain, the proportion of individuals that would like to
work more hours than they currently do has increased
dramatically during the Great Recession (Torre Fernán-
dez, 2017), particularly among immigrant women.
Our third outcome of interest is over-education. It
is well documented that immigrants in most countries
are more likely to be over-educated than similar mem-
bers of the majority group (see, for example: Leuven &
Oosterbeek, 2011; Quintini, 2011). Such educational mis-
match between workers´ human capital and employers´
demands can be explained either because immigrants
have less specific human capital (supply side), or because
employers might lack information about potential pro-
ductivity or skills of new immigrants (demand side). Ei-
ther way, the study of over-education of immigrants has
a special relevance in Spain, an economy characterized
by pronounced labour market segmentation, the exten-
sion of low productivity jobs, and an oversupply of highly
educated young people.
In Section 2, we provide a succinct description of
Spain’s recent history as immigration country and the
economic integration patterns of the main immigrant
minorities. Then, in Section 2.2., we present a brief
overview of the state of the Spanish labour market be-
fore and after the Great Recession. In Sections 3 and 4
we document the data and methods used in the empiri-
cal part, which starts with descriptive results and culmi-
nates in a set of logistic regressions comparing how im-
migrants perform in the Spanish labour market relative
to the majority group. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Contextual Framework: Immigrants in the
Spanish Labour Market
2.1. Spain as a Recent Migration Destination
Spain did not receive significant migration inflows until
the end of the 1990s and was, in fact, a sending coun-
try during much of the twentieth century. This situa-
tion changed during the 2000s, when Spain became a
top destination country for international migrants and
started receiving inflows from Latin America, Eastern Eu-
rope and North Africa. The foreign-born population in-
creased from 2.9% in 1998 to 13.1% in 2007 (authors’ cal-
culations using official data from the Spanish Statistical
Office2), becoming in 2007 the second-largest receiver
of immigrants in absolute terms among the OECD coun-
tries (OECD, 2018). The exceptionality of the Spanish mi-
gration inflows during this period was mainly driven by
Latin Americans, particularly from Ecuador (Pellegrino,
2004). The volume and intensity of the inflows could be
attributed to the tourist visa exemption arrangements
that were in place until the mid-2000s with many Latin
American countries.
The government’s tolerance towards the shadow
economy, which represented around 22% of the GDP
in 2007 (Williams, 2014), along with the weak enforce-
ment of internal controls resulted in a rapid increase in
immigrants working illegally during the early 2000s. As
it occurred in other European countries, most immigrant
men and women in Spain had high employment rates be-
fore the crisis, though they concentrated in unskilled and
low paid jobs (Bernardi, Garrido, & Miyar, 2011; Kogan,
2006). Immigrant women, particularly those from Latin
America and Romania, satisfied the demand for domes-
tic workers driven by the labour market incorporation
of women from the majority group (Da Roit, González-
Ferrer, & Moreno-Fuentes, 2013). In this regard, 45% of
female immigrants in the work force were employed in
the care and cleaning sectors in 2013, most of them
as domestic workers in the shadow economy (Sánchez-
Domínguez & Fahlén, 2017). Immigrant men from non-
EU-15 countries were also attracted by the high demand
for unskilled labour in the booming construction sec-
tor during the early 2000s. In consequence, many im-
migrant men became unemployed with the burst of the
real-estate bubble in 2008 (Stanek & Veira, 2012). As ex-
pected, the economic recession slowed down the migra-
tion inflows and stimulated the outflows to the point that
the netmigration rate turned negative from2012 to 2014
(Izquierdo, Jimeno, & Lacuesta, 2016). The outflowswere
mainly formed by immigrantswho had arrived during the
economic boom of the early 2000s and whowere return-
ing to their origin countries or migrating to another Euro-
pean country.
1 Another widespread indicator such as the proportion fixed-term contracts is not a proper measure to account for crisis effects given its pro-cyclical
nature. In 2014 the proportion of fixed-term contracts was reduced in greater proportion for immigrants not as a result of a reduction in the ethnic
penalties but rather as a composition effect: the destruction of employment was more intense for workers without indefinite contract.
2 Instituto Nacional de Estadística (www.ine.es).
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The ethnic composition of the migrant population in
Spain is different to that in other European countries,
principally due to the presence of Latin American immi-
grants. Latin Americans made up 30.7% of the foreign-
born population in 2016, the main origin countries being
Ecuador, Colombia and Argentina. Migration flows from
Eastern Europe, particularly from Romania, started later
but continued growing even during the economic crisis,
representing the 14.2% of the foreign-born population
in 2016. Immigrants from Middle East and North African
countries (MENA), most of whom are Moroccans, made
up 15.8% of the foreign-born population in 2016, while
EU-15 immigrants comprise the 16.4% of the foreign-
born in the same year. The second generation in Spain
is still coming of age and thus, there is no empirical evi-
dence on the labourmarket integration of the children im-
migrants born in Spain. We aim to partially filling this gap
in the article, though we group together the 1.5 and the
second generation in the same analytical category due to
the low number of cases relative to the first generation.
2.2. The Spanish Labour Market: Economic Crisis, Labour
Market Reform, and Duality
The Spanish labour market is conventionally associated
with high unemployment rates, especially among young
people, as well as a marked insider-outsider divide (Ben-
tolila, Dolado, & Jimeno, 2012). Since the liberalization
of the labour market in 1984, Spain is also known for
the high incidence of temporal employment (Polavieja,
2005). While this general characterization is still by and
large accurate (Domínguez, 2015), the last decade has
seen two major shifts that have altered the structural
conditions of immigrants’ labour market participation in
significant ways: the Great Recession, beginning in 2008,
and the labour market reform of 2012.
The financial and economic crisis hit Spain excep-
tionally hard. Between 2008 and 2013, the GDP con-
tracted by an aggregate of almost 9%, and the unem-
ployment rate rose from 8% in 2007 to 26% in 2013
(The World Bank, 2017). Consequently, Spain exhibits
one of worst profiles in terms of quality of employ-
ment within the EU-15. The phenomenon that perhaps
captures the devastating impact of the Great Recession
more clearly is long-term unemployment (i.e., lasting
more than 12 months). In 2008, when the economy was
still humming, this was a marginal phenomenon that af-
fected less than 3% of any social group.3 The percent-
age was even lower among immigrants than themajority
group, with second-generation of MENA immigrant de-
scent being the only outlier in this regard. In 2014, one
out of ten Spanish born (majority group) was long-term
unemployed, and this percentage reached 15.1% among
male first-generation immigrants from Latin America and
as high as 26.5% among those from MENA countries.
The 2012 labour market reform introduced a great
deal of added flexibility for employers to hire and fire
workers, particularly through diminished employment
protection and the use of part-time employment con-
tracts. The purpose of the reform, which can be de-
scribed as “broad-brush liberalization” (Picot & Tassinari,
2014) was to inject new dynamism into the stagnant
labour market (cf. Domínguez, 2015) and to break up the
duality and segmentation.
As Fernández and Heras (2015) show, the incidence
of part-time employment has increased during recent
years partly as a result of the 2012 labour market re-
form. However, in contrast with the spirit of the new leg-
islation, this uptick in the use of part-time arrangements
has been largely involuntary, i.e., by workers who would
rather work full-time but accepted a part-time arrange-
ment after being unemployed for some time (cf. Torre
Fernández, 2017). In this regard, the incidence of invol-
untary part-time work could in fact be considered an
indicator of the quality of employment in this context
of recession. In this regard, Spain had the second high-
est rate of involuntary fixed-term contracts in the Eu-
ropean Union in 2013 (López-Mourelo & Malo, 2014).
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014, p. 952) con-
clude that:
the duality of the Spanish labour market has been
strengthened in the last two decades, so that 30% of
the working people, those with temporary contracts,
bear most of employment turnover, to the extent
that all the flexibility of the labour market is provided
by them.
3. Data and Operationalisation of Variables
We use the 2008 and 2014 ad-hoc modules of the EU-
Labour Force Survey for Spain, which feature a set of
items on the labour market situation of migrants and
their descendants. The variables that have been included
in the two ad-hoc modules are mostly identical, so we
can compare the labour market integration of immi-
grants in Spain right at the beginning of the 2007–2008
financial crisis and after six years of economic recession.
It is relevant to note that all immigrants living in Spain,
irrespective of whether they have legal residence permit
or not, could be sampled in the LFS. Our analytical sam-
ple includes only individuals between age 16 and 64 and
it excludes retirees and individuals in education.
We distinguish between majority group, first- and
second-generation immigrant descent. The majority
group comprises respondents born in Spain with both
parents also born in Spain. Foreign-born individuals who
migrated to Spain after age 14 are considered the first
generation. Finally, the 1.5 and second generation have
been grouped together due to the small number of ob-
servations. Consequently, when using the term second
generation, we refer to respondents born in Spainwith at
least one parent born abroad and to those born abroad
and migrating to Spain before age 14.
3 Authors’ calculations based on EU-LFS (Eurostat, 2018).
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We use information on the individual, the father and
the mother’s country of birth to identify immigrants’ na-
tional origin. Since the data does not give disaggregated
information on country of birth but only on the geograph-
ical region of birth, we have grouped immigrants into
the following categories: Latinos or Latin Americans, East-
ern Europeans, Middle East and North Africans (MENA),
and Western Europeans (EU-15 and EFTA). Respondents
born in other regions of the world (e.g., East Asia) are
excluded due to the small number of observations. For
the same reason, we also disregard second generation
respondents from Eastern Europe.
Regarding the dependent variables, the first outcome
measures whether workers are in paid employment (vs.
unemployed or inactive). The second outcome indicates
whether workers are in an involuntary part-time job,
which refers to individuals who are working part-time be-
cause they report that they could not find a full-time job.
This definition excludes part-timers due to other reasons
such as having an illness or looking after children or in-
capacitated adults. In the empirical analysis, involuntary
part-timers are compared toworkers in voluntary arrange-
ments, who are employed either full-time or part-time.
Qualification mismatch is usually measured empiri-
cally by comparing individuals’ education with the edu-
cational requirements of their jobs or occupations. Thus,
workers are considered over-educated if they have a
higher educational level compared to the education re-
quired by their jobs. Different operationalisations have
been proposed in the literature to measure required
qualifications (for a review, see: Leuven & Oosterbeek,
2011). In this article, we use the statistical definition of
over-education based on the mean (Verdugo & Verdugo,
1989). According to this definition, workers are consid-
ered over-educated if their level of education (expressed
in years of schooling) is above the mean plus one stan-
dard deviation within their occupation (expressed at the
2-digit level).4
In addition to ethnicity and generation, the follow-
ing control variables are included in the analyses: respon-
dents’ age (in 5-year age bands), educational level and
civil status (which distinguishes between being married,
cohabiting or in a registered union, and single, nevermar-
ried, separated, divorced or widowed). We also include
an indicator of the presence of dependent children in
the household, as well as the degree of urbanisation of
the area where respondents live, which distinguishes be-
tween cities, towns/suburbs and rural areas.
The educational level is operationalised in four dif-
ferent categories based on the ISCED 2011 classifica-
tion, that is, primary or no formal education (ISCED 0
and 1); lower secondary education (ISCED 2); upper sec-
ondary education (ISCED 3 and 4); and tertiary education
(ISCED 5 and above). Social class is operationalisedwith a
4-class version of the European Socio-economic Classifi-
cation (Rose&Harrison, 2007), a further development of
the class scheme developed bay Erikson and Goldthorpe
(1992); ISCO-08 codes from the 2014 survey were trans-
posed into ISCO-88 codes for this purpose.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Results
Tables 1 and 2 presents descriptive statistics for all the
control and outcome variables in terms of respondents’
migrant origins and generation.5 The demographic pro-
file shows that immigrants in Spain (exceptWestern Euro-
peans) tend to be younger than the majority population,
although the gap has shrunk with time. While there is a
female majority among Latinos, the sex-ratio for MENA
immigrants has been biased towards males. For the first
generation, the percentage of respondents living with
their partners is higher for Eastern European and MENA
migrants than for themajority population,Western Euro-
peans and Latinos. The percentage of respondents with
dependent children is higher than among the majority
group, reflecting well-known fertility patterns (Castro-
Martín & Martín-García, 2013).
In terms of educational attainment, all ethnic minori-
ties have lower levels than the majority group, except
for Western Europeans, who are more highly educated
than Spaniards. Because of the late educational expan-
sion in Spain, the academic qualifications among older
workers is still substantially lower than in other devel-
oped countries. Immigrants from MENA countries have
by far the lowest level of education, with around half
not even reaching lower secondary education. Between
2008 and 2014, educational attainment has generally im-
proved for both the majority group and immigrants. The
exception is the second generation of immigrant descent
from Latin American and MENA countries, who have
even worsened their educational profiles. In the case of
Latinos, this may be due to the somewhat lower average
age of second-generation of immigrant descent.
Looking at the degree of urbanization of the areas
where immigrants and the majority group live, in 2008
there was hardly any difference between both groups
(about half living in urban areas and the other half in
smaller towns or the countryside), except for Latin Amer-
icans who are far more often living in cities. By 2014,
the share of immigrants living in larger cities notably de-
creased, now all except Latinos are just as likely to live in
smaller towns.
Turning to our three dependent variables, Tables 3
and 4 show the labour market outcomes of immigrants
4 Sometimes it is possible to use a subjective measure by asking workers about the schooling requirements for their job and then comparing those to
the education of the worker; or by directly asking workers if they feel over-qualified or over-educated. A question of this kind is included in the ad hoc
module of the 2014 LFS to subjectively assess over-education among immigrant workers. Unfortunately we cannot use such self-assessment measure
because it is only included in 2014 and the majority group are not asked about it. Nor is it possible to measure over-education based on the so-called
“job analysis” or “objective” measure because there is no equivalent to the American Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) in the European context.
5 Additional descriptive tables are available upon request.
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Table 1. Sociodemographic and control variables by gender, ethnicity and generation (%) in 2008.
Majority
group
Latinos East EU MENA West Europeans
1st gen. 2nd gen. 1st gen. 1st gen. 2nd gen. 1st gen. 2nd gen.
Gender (% female) 49.5 54.8 48.0 52.9 39.7 42.8 49.4 41.0
Age 41.2 36.1 31.0 34.7 35.7 29.4 44.8 34.3
Married/In a civil union/ 58.3 49.0 28.8 65.9 71.5 35.2 58.1 33.5
Cohabiting
Have dependent children living 31.2 56.7 31.0 44.5 58.4 47.5 39.3 28.4
at home
Educational attainment
No formal education (or 18.8 18.9 15.4 10.5 55.0 22.1 12.5 15.4
ISCED 1 and below)
Lower secondary education 30.7 20.8 33.9 17.7 15.3 34.0 12.8 38.0
Upper secondary education 20.0 40.8 24.8 48.6 20.6 26.0 26.9 21.8
Tertiary education 30.5 19.5 25.8 23.2 9.1 18.0 47.8 24.9
Degree of urbanisation
Densely-populated are (cities) 50.1 67.1 74.2 47.4 47.8 57.6 47.6 49.9
Intermediate density area 24.7 18.7 13.3 27.0 25.8 26.5 27.4 27.7
(towns and suburbs)
Thinly-populated area (rural) 25.2 14.2 12.5 25.6 26.3 15.9 24.9 22.4
(N) 52,726 2,090 252 792 662 200 411 366
Table 2. Sociodemographic and control variables by gender, ethnicity and generation (%) in 2014.
Majority
group
Latinos East EU MENA West Europeans
1st gen. 2nd gen. 1st gen. 1st gen. 2nd gen. 1st gen. 2nd gen.
Gender (% female) 49.7 59.3 53.5 52.8 46.6 49.1 49.1 46.0
Age 42.5 40.5 29.1 39.9 40.5 28.9 46.1 34.6
Married/In a civil union/ 54.1 51.6 20.6 63.9 82.0 30.0 53.8 30.7
Cohabiting
Have dependent children living 32.6 54.0 38.2 45.2 73.4 48.1 39.4 28.4
at home
Educational attainment
No formal education (or 9.9 14.6 10.1 9.3 50.4 22.3 8.1 10.5
ISCED 1 and below)
Lower secondary education 33.2 22.8 39.0 17.2 21.2 39.0 15.8 30.8
Upper secondary education 21.0 37.1 29.5 42.7 17.3 20.5 25.0 26.0
Tertiary education 35.9 25.5 21.4 30.9 11.0 18.3 51.1 32.7
Degree of urbanisation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Densely-populated are (cities) 47.2 63.0 51.8 36.9 37.8 49.5 39.3 41.8
Intermediate density area 26.8 18.7 30.1 36.8 36.2 35.0 37.0 34.6
(towns and suburbs)
Thinly-populated area (rural) 26.1 18.3 18.0 26.3 26.0 15.5 23.7 23.5
(N) 52,449 1,925 397 815 750 236 429 456
and the majority group in 2008 and 2014, distinguishing
between ethnicity, generation as well as gender.
Having a paid job is essential to economic well-being,
and we can see that although male first-generation im-
migrants did worse than the majority group in 2008, dif-
ferences are small (we do not pay much attention to the
larger gaps among the second-generation gapswhich are
partly attributable to lower ages and people still finish-
ing their education). In 2014, however, we observemuch
more pronounced interethnic disparities. The employ-
ment rates of the majority group decreased significantly
due to theGreat Recession, but evenmore starkly among
immigrants. For example, the proportion of paid em-
ployees among first generation immigrants from MENA
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Table 3. Labour market outcomes by ethnicity and generation in 2008 and 2014 (males).
Have job Involuntary part time Over-education
	 2008 2014 2008 2014 2008 2014
Majority group 84.7 71.1 1.4 4.7 30.4 28.3
Latinos — 1st gen 82.5 64.9 4.2 10.5 49.6 46.0
Latinos — 2nd gen 59.5 47.7 2.1 18.5 28.5 32.2
East EU — 1st gen 80.3 63.1 2.3 12.8 70.0 69.0
MENA — 1st gen 68.6 42.0 6.6 13.4 29.7 25.6
MENA — 2nd gen 76.9 42.2 0.3 13.8 27.7 23.9
West Europeans — 1st gen 78.1 71.8 0.1 3.4 43.4 38.9
West Europeans — 2nd gen 75.8 62.8 0.5 7.7 29.2 29.2
(N) 28,591 28,300 24,125 19,568 27,456 26,317
Table 4. Labour market outcomes by ethnicity and generation in 2008 and 2014 (females).
Have job Involuntary part time Over-education
	 2008 2014 2008 2014 2008 2014
Majority group 62.2 58.5 6.5 13.9 29.5 34.1
Latinos — 1st gen 73.8 62.7 15.0 29.8 41.5 50.0
Latinos — 2nd gen 63.8 46.7 6.0 20.7 18.7 37.0
East EU — 1st gen 65.4 56.7 12.6 34.7 55.0 61.9
MENA — 1st gen 32.2 22.5 17.8 27.2 32.7 27.6
MENA — 2nd gen 54.7 35.3 10.6 17.8 25.7 26.0
West Europeans — 1st gen 50.2 54.5 10.9 11.5 45.3 37.6
West Europeans — 2nd gen 68.4 53.5 5.6 13.6 20.4 37.9
(N) 29,887 30,340 18,114 17,084 23,311 24,460
origins dropped from 68.9% to 41.1%. The comparison
with women shows that while female employment rates
in 2008 were much lower to begin with, they also de-
creased to a smaller extent. This is true for both the ma-
jority group and immigrants and confirms that the re-
cent economic crisis in Spain hit male-dominated seg-
ments of the labourmarket, particularly construction, es-
pecially hard. Nevertheless, women of all origins remain
clearly disadvantaged compared to men in terms of par-
ticipation in paid work, with the sole exception of Latin
American women who are almost on par with their male
counter-parts. Although female immigrants from MENA
countries already had markedly low levels of employ-
ment before the crisis—which may be due to traditional
gender roles among religious Muslims (Guetto & Fellini,
2017)—the most striking number may be that only 22%
of them had a paid job in 2014.
Let us turn our attention next to the issue of invol-
untary part-time work. The data show very neatly that
this is a markedly female problem, with women’s inci-
dence rates more than doubling that of men’s across
the board. Moreover, we find sizeable ethnic gaps, es-
pecially regarding the first generation: one seventh of
employed Latin American women involuntarily worked
only part-time in 2008, and this proportion spiked to al-
most one third in 2014. Again, immigrants with MENA
origins are even worse off. The most drastic increase was
experienced by Eastern European women among whom
the share of involuntary part-timers skyrocketed from
12.6% in 2008 to 34.7%. Notably, among male second-
generation Latin Americans, the proportion reached
18.25% in 2014, about four times the share among
country-born men. In 2008, first-generation men from
MENA countries were the only clearly distinguishable
risk group, though on much lower levels.
Finally, we examine the incidence of over-education
across ethnic groups. As the baseline numbers for the
majority group highlight, this is a notorious problem in
Spain, where ever more college graduates enter labour
market with few high-skilled vacancies. According to
our calculation, around 30% of the majority group were
over-educated in 2008. Until 2014, this number went
down slightly for country-born men, mostly due to the
recession-induced loss of many jobs in the low-skill sec-
tor. For women, it went up, and their higher risk of over-
education also reflects the fact that women by now have
outpaced men in educational attainment rates.
Moreover, the analysis by ethnic origins reveals hefty
rates of over-education, particularly among first gener-
ation Latin Americans (almost half) and Eastern Euro-
peans. Among the latter, we register more than two out
of three male workers as being over-educated, and by
2014 women only barely fare better. Interestingly, immi-
grants from MENA countries are largely sheltered from
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this particular risk, albeit mostly by virtue of lower ed-
ucational attainment levels. Vice versa, Western Europe
cannot be regarded as privileged on this account as they
exhibit significantly higher rates of over-education than
the majority group. Second generation of immigrant de-
scent largely have moderate incidence rates, arguably
partly because they have not all finished their education
when surveyed.
4.2. Multivariate Statistical Analyses
In order to find out whether the descriptive findings so
far are robust to compositional effects, we now turn to
themultivariate analysis. Wewill present a series of logit
models that control for age, civil status, dependent chil-
dren, education, language skills and area of residence.
For easier interpretation, we will show results in terms
of predicted probabilities rather than logit coefficients.
4.2.1. Paid Employment
We begin again by considering ethnic gaps in paid em-
ployment and differentiate by both gender and year of
observation. Figure 1 shows the probabilities of hold-
ing a paid job as predicted by our models according
to ethnic origin and generation of immigrant descent.
In the left panel, it becomes apparent that although
the (composition-adjusted) employment rate of country-
born men was the highest in 2008, there are only three
ethnic groups for whom we find significantly lower rates
among males. This is the case for second generation
immigrant descent from Latin America, as well as first
generation East Europeans and immigrants from MENA
countries. For the other groups our estimates are not pre-
cise enough tomake definitive statements (note that the
bars in the graph denote 90% confidence intervals).
The juxtaposition with women’s employment situa-
tion in 2008 exposes the profound gender divide on the
Spanish labour market that affects all ethnic origins. In-
terestingly, instead of country-bornwomen, it is first gen-
eration Latinas (closely followed by second generation
West Europeans) who fare best in terms of their labour
market participation. The only origin groups for which
we register significantly lower employment shares than
among female country-born are first generation immi-
grants from MENA and West European countries.
Due to the crisis in 2014, we again observe a marked
drop in employment levels among men. While the un-
certainty around several of our estimates is consider-
able, the predicted probabilities of having a paid job are
similar for the majority group, West Europeans as well
as the second generation with origin in Latin America
andMENA countries. By contrast, first generation Latinos
and Eastern Europeans evidently struggle to find employ-
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of paid employment for immigrants and the majority group in 2008 and 2014. Notes:
Controls for age, education, civil status, dependent children and degree of urbanization; N = 114,956; age 16–64, not in
education/training or retired (Full sample); bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Weighted and clustered by region.
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ment. However, first generation immigrants from MENA
origins are by far in the worst situation. Even after ad-
justing for socio-economic characteristics, their degree
of economic incorporation remains strikingly poor. Also,
among women, immigrants from the Middle East and
North Africa are the clear outlier in this analysis and
have to be regarded as the most vulnerable minority
group. Otherwise, we observe onlymoderate differences
across ethnic origins among women in 2014. The reces-
sion seems to have led to a certain convergence of fe-
male employment rates in Spain.
4.2.2. Involuntary Part-Time Work
In the US, almost all the increase in part time work since
the 1970s has been driven by those who would prefer to
work full time (Farber, 1999); that has been particularly
the case during the last economic recession (Valletta &
Van der List, 2015).
Regardless of workers’ preferences, non-standard
employment arrangements such as part-time and tem-
porarywork have becomemorewidespread over the last
decades (Kalleberg, 2000). Part-time jobs have been pro-
moted by employers because they can be created and
eliminated more easily and the hourly wages are lower
than in fulltime jobs, even after controlling for workers’
education, experience, and other relevant variables (Fer-
ber & Waldfogel, 1998; Tilly, 1996).
Part-time workers, irrespective of their preferences
for that type of contract, notably increased from the
1970s onwards, when the structural changes in the
global economy started requiring more flexibility in em-
ployment (Kalleberg, 2000). Prior research has shown
hourly wages are lower than in full time jobs, even af-
ter controlling for workers’ education, experience, and
other relevant variables (Ferber & Waldfogel, 1998; Tilly,
1996). In addition, part-timers also obtain lower wage
returns to experience and seniority (Farber, 1999). It is
also important to remark that part-time work is, to a cer-
tain extent, a female phenomenon, as in all industrial
economies, most part-time workers are women (Bloss-
feld & Hakim, 1997).
The empirical analyses for this section do not esti-
mate the prevalence of part-time work for the second
and the first generation within each ethnicity. The main
reason to do so is that the number of second gener-
ation respondents who are involuntary part-timers is
very small for Eastern Europeans and MENA immigrants
when we run separate analyses for each gender and year.
Therefore, we only include a control for generation of im-
migrant descent and estimate the results for each eth-
nicity. We control for social class to account for the stark
stratification of the Spanish labour market.
In Spain, involuntary part-time work is a phe-
nomenon that has historically affected the female work-
ing population. Before the crisis, the predicted percent-
age of male part-timers was similar and relatively low for
all ethnicities (between 1 and 5%), while the predicted
percentage among females was between 6 and 9% for
themajority group andWest Europeans, and between 13
and 16% for Latinas, Eastern EU and female immigrants
from MENA countries. As expected, the (composition-
adjusted) incidence of involuntary part-time work in-
creases substantially for all the working population dur-
ing the Great Recession, particularly for Latino and East-
ern European females. Latino, Eastern Europeans and
MENA males and females tend to work in different sec-
tors (males in construction and service, females in clean-
ing and catering), though they are both over-represented
in routine and low-skilled occupations. Crucially, invol-
untary part-time work notably increased from 2008 to
2014 among females in routine occupations—most likely,
thoseworking in the cleaning and caring sectors and, to a
lesser extent, females in low-skilled service/sales/clerical
occupations (see Figure A1 in Annex). It is thus not sur-
prising that female immigrants are the most affected
group in terms of involuntary part-time work during
the crisis.
With regard to female workers (right panel in Fig-
ure 2), we no longer find significant differences across
ethnicities in the probability of working part-time invol-
untarily once we control for relevant demographic and
socioeconomic variables, both before (2008) and during
the economic crisis (2014). Most likely, this is because
we are controlling for education and social class. This is
indeed a relevant finding, as it shows that the increase
in involuntary part-timers among Latinas and Eastern Eu-
ropean females during the crisis can be almost entirely
attributed to a compositional effect. Immigrant women
are overrepresented in low skilled occupations in the
cleaning and caring sectors, where the incidence of in-
voluntary part-time work has increased the most during
the recession (see Figure A1 in the Annex). Thus, once
we estimate the ethnic gaps including the control vari-
ables in the models, the probability of being an involun-
tary part-timer compared to country-born women is no
longer higher for immigrant women.
At face value, involuntary part-time work increased
more during the crisis among Latinos, Eastern Euro-
peans and MENA immigrant males than among Spanish
country-bornmen. However, after controlling for compo-
sitional effects, the probability of being an involuntary
part-timer for immigrants is not significantly different to
that for the majority group (left panel in Figure 2).
4.2.3. Over-Education
Prior research has shown that the return to immigrants’
human capital is lower (Hardoy & Schøne, 2014) and,
on top of that, their labour market outcomes are more
strongly affected by economic downturns. In Spain, the
importance of education in preventing unemployment
increased when the economy went into recession, but
this change was more intense for the majority group
than for immigrant workers. In other words, the cri-
sis made education a more important asset to pre-
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Figure 2. Predicted probabilities for involuntary part-time work across ethnicities in 2008 and 2014. Notes: Controls for
first generation, age, education, social class, civil status, dependent children and degree of urbanisation; N = 77,284 (only
working sample); age 16–64, not in education/training or retired; bars represent 90% confidence intervals; weighted and
clustered by region.
vent unemployment, but the majority group have ben-
efited more from the higher market value of their edu-
cational credentials than immigrants. Consequently, the
economic crisis has amplified the labour market inequal-
ity betweenmigrants and country-born workers in terms
of employment (Cebolla-Boado, Miyar-Busto, & Muñoz-
Comet, 2015). In this vein, it is expected that immigrant
workers face on average a higher risk of over-education
compared to the majority group, and that the shrink in
employment as a consequence of the economic crisis in
the country has magnified these gaps.
To address this issue, we ran different models on the
probability of being over-qualified for highly educated
immigrants taking into account not only the region of
origin but also the immigrant generation and the time
of residence.6 Figure 3 shows the main results for differ-
ent groups of migrants separated by gender. A first rele-
vant result worthy to be highlighted are the marked dif-
ferences between first and second generation. With the
exception of female second generation Latinas—who
even have a lower risk of over-education compared to
the majority group -the risk of over-education for sec-
ond generation of migrant descent is not significantly
different to that of the majority group. The first genera-
tion, however, does have a greater risk of over-education
compared to the majority group. Yet, there are marked
differences between ethnic groups: the largest gap is
observed among first generation male migrants from
Eastern Europe (almost twice as much over-educated
as the majority group), followed by immigrants from
MENA countries and Latinos. On the contrary, immi-
grants from EU-15/EFTA are indistinguishable from the
majority group in terms of over-education. This first re-
sults points to the difficulties of making transferable the
educational credentials that face first generation immi-
grants frommore linguistic and cultural distant countries
and confirms that foreign human capital earns lower re-
turns than domestic human capital (Friedberg, 2000; San-
romá, Ramos, & Simón, 2015).
Different reasons related both to the demand and
supply side of the labour market explain that the
first-generation immigrants experience educational mis-
match upon arrival. Yet it is expected that gaps between
immigrants and the majority group in terms of earnings
(Chiswick, 1978) or over-education (Chiswick & Miller,
2009) decrease or even fade away with years of resi-
dence. In this regard, more years of residence in the host
country represent more time to acquire specific human
capital (both education or job experience), to improve
their command of the language and ultimately to acquire
6 Note that unlike previous economic outcomes in these models, we restricted the analyses to highly educated immigrants, referring to those with upper
secondary and tertiary education. The reason is that in the statistical measure of over-qualification those individuals with lower levels of education
cannot be classified as over-qualified by definition.
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Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of over-education for first- and second-generation, by gender (pooled data). Notes: Con-
trols for age, year, civil status, dependent children and degree of urbanisation; the category “Eastern Europeans second
generation” is omitted given its small size; N = 56,514; only high-skilled migrants aged 16–64, not in education/training or
retired; weighted and clustered by region.
relevant knowledge in the labour market, which would
in turn increase the probability of improving their po-
sition in the job market. However, contrary to the the-
oretical expectations, in Spain there is not a clear con-
vergence between immigrants and the majority group in
their risk of over-education as time of residence in the
host country increases. As Figure 3 shows, although in
general the risk of over-education seems tobe somewhat
reduced for the first generation immigrants with more
than 10 years of residence in the country compared to
more recent migrants, differences between both groups
are not statistically significant in virtually all groups of im-
migrants.7 This suggests that immigrants in Spain seem
stuck in jobs for which they are over-educated many
years after their arrival with virtually no improvement in
the adjustment of their qualifications and those required
by the jobs.
All in all, there is not a clear crisis effect, since there
are not marked variations in predicted probabilities as a
result of the changes in macroeconomic conditions be-
tween 2008 and 2014. As can be seen in Table A1 in Ap-
pendix, a slight increase in the probability of being over-
educated is observed for most groups. In fact, Fernández
and Ortega (2008) find the same ethnic gaps in the prob-
ability of being over-educated for Eastern Europeans and
Latin Americans in a context of economic growth.
Factoring in migrant generation, region of origin and
time of residence and economic context in the host coun-
try is of utmost importance to explain the differences in
the risk of over-education of immigrants. However, there
are at least two other relevant determinants to fully un-
derstand both the transferability of qualifications and as-
similation processes for highly educated immigrants: the
command of the host language and the recognition of
their foreign qualifications. Fortunately, we can evaluate
the effect of these aspects because the LFS ad hoc mod-
ule in 2008 contains information on both issues. On the
one hand, it is asked whether the immigrant consider
that their lack of host-country language skills constitutes
a barrier to finding a job matches their qualifications. On
the other hand, it is asked the place where the highest
level of education was acquired and, in the case of quali-
fications acquired abroad, if their degrees have a formal
recognition in the host country.
As can be seen in Figure 4, there are differences
in the risk of over-education among immigrants with
and without language difficulties. Following our expec-
tations immigrants with language difficulties have a sig-
nificant higher probability of over-education than immi-
grants with a good command of the Spanish language.
However, it is important to note that regardless their
language skills, all immigrants in Spain have a signifi-
cant higher risk of being over-qualified than the major-
ity group. As regards to the transferability of qualifica-
tions, the most remarkable result is that only those im-
migrants without the recognition of their foreign qualifi-
7 To verify the robustness of this result, other specifications (available upon request) have been run with different thresholds and the results do not
vary substantially.
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of over-education by language skills and transferability of qualifications. Notes: Controls
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tion/training or retired in 2008; weighted and clustered by region.
cations seem to be significantly penalised. Interestingly,
compared to the majority group we do not find signifi-
cant differences in the risk of over-education among im-
migrants who acquire their highest educational degree
in Spain or those who managed to recognize their for-
eign degree. Therefore, it seems that in Spain, contrary
to other countries (for an analysis for several European
countries, see: Damas de Matos & Liebig, 2014), the ori-
gin of human capital and specifically the recognition of
the foreign qualification is the most prominent determi-
nant of over-education and has a larger impact than lan-
guage difficulties.
Taken together, these results suggest that the difficul-
ties that immigrants face to use their human capital ac-
quired abroad in the Spanish labour market are not only
attributable to the crisis but rather a structural problem.
Neither the changes in the macroeconomic situation nor
the acquisition of experience in the destination country
seem to substantially change the risk of over-education
for first generation migrants. There only seems to be
assimilation with second generation immigrant of de-
scent, whose education and work experience has been
acquired in the country of destination.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
This article has provided fresh evidence on ethnic strati-
fication of the Spanish labour market. From a descriptive
point of view, we have shown that Latinos, Eastern Eu-
ropeans and, particularly, MENA immigrant males have
been hit harder by the Great Recession than Spanish
country-born men in terms of employment. As in other
Mediterranean countries (Reyneri & Fullin, 2011), immi-
grants enjoyed high employment levels before the reces-
sion, but the economic crisis in Spain was devastating,
particularly for male-dominated segments of the labour
market such as the construction sector, where many im-
migrants were employed. However, even after control-
ling for compositional effects, first generation men from
these three minorities are significantly less likely to be
employed than the majority group. This is not the case
for females, as we find no significant differences in the
probability of being in paid employment across groups
oncewe control for compositional effects. Yet, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that some of the immigrants who
became unemployed during the economic crisis have re-
turned to their origin countries. Considering that, the
ethnic gaps described in the article are likely to be lower
bound estimates of the gaps that would exist without re-
turn migration.
There is a clear gender divide among immigrants in
the Spanish labour market, most likely due to the differ-
ent sectors where males and females work. While un-
employment has hit particularly immigrant men from
Latino, Eastern European and MENA origins, female mi-
grants have beenmore affected by involuntary part-time
work. In fact, involuntary part-time work is, above all, a
female phenomenon, as women are more likely to be
in involuntary part time at all times. Latinas, Eastern Eu-
ropeans and MENA immigrant women were more likely
to be involuntary part-timers than country-born in 2008,
and they also experience a higher increase in involuntary
part-timework during the crisis. Interestingly, this seems
to be entirely a compositional effect driven by the labour
market sector where the majority of immigrant women
from these three minorities work (i.e., low-skilled jobs in
the service, cleaning and caring sectors). Selective return
migration may also have affected our findings, although
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the existent theoretical accounts are not univocal about
the attendant patterns of selection to be expected (Bor-
jas & Bratsberg, 1996; Van Hook & Zhang, 2011), nor is
there clear empirical evidence on Spain on the educa-
tional profiles of leavers versus stayers (Cebolla-Boado
& González, 2013).
With regard to over-education, there are no marked
variations in predicted probabilities across ethnicities
and generations as a result of the changes in macroeco-
nomic conditions between 2008 and 2014. Besides, we
found that second generations are not clearly distinct
from the majority group, a sign of successful economic
incorporation. On the contrary, the first generation has
a greater risk of over-education than the majority group
before and during the crisis. In particular, we have shown
that in contrast to other labour market outcomes, the
largest gap is observed among first generation migrants
from Eastern Europe, followed by Latinos and Western
Europeans. This reinforces the idea that foreign human
capital is less valued than human capital acquired at des-
tination, and it also shows the difficulties of making the
educational credentials of first generation immigrants in
Spain transferable.
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Figure A1. Predicted probabilities of involuntary part-time work across social classes in 2008 and 2014. Notes: Controls for
ethnicity, first generation, age, education, civil status, dependent children and degree of urbanisation. Notes: N = 77,284
(only working sample); age 16–64, not in education/training or retired; self-employed/small employers excluded due to
low number of cases (160); bars represent 90% confidence intervals; weighted and clustered by region.
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Table A1. Determinants of over-education of immigrants in Spain. Odds ratio.
Years Gender
Pooled 2008 2014 Males Females
Ethnicity, generation and time of residence1 (ref: Majority group)
Latinos 2nd gen 0.934 0.784 1.018 1.125 0.787
[0.126] [0.168] [0.130] [0.172] [0.122]
Latinos 1st gen — long (>10 years) 2.450*** 1.364 2.970*** 2.600*** 2.286***
[0.300] [0.386] [0.456] [0.289] [0.430]
Latinos 1st gen — recent (≤10 years) 2.846*** 2.636*** 3.499*** 3.047*** 2.740***
[0.315] [0.356] [0.463] [0.596] [0.352]
Eastern Europeans 1st gen — long (>10 years) 6.911*** 3.204*** 8.305*** 9.161*** 5.409***
[1.192] [0.661] [1.988] [1.810] [1.503]
Eastern Europeans 1st gen - recent (≤10 years) 4.249*** 4.029*** 4.877*** 9.475*** 2.913***
[0.723] [0.667] [1.284] [2.796] [0.414]
MENA 2nd gen 1.086 1.252 0.883 1.186 0.967
[0.185] [0.357] [0.206] [0.212] [0.240]
MENA 1st gen — long (>10 years) 4.908*** 3.516*** 6.257*** 4.754*** 7.567***
[1.346] [1.414] [1.703] [1.438] [2.635]
MENA 1st gen — recent (≤10 years) 4.489*** 6.034*** 2.320 5.405*** 3.538***
[1.116] [1.132] [1.256] [2.717] [1.424]
EU-15/EFTA 2nd gen 0.772* 0.637*** 0.814 0.713** 0.810
[0.109] [0.112] [0.196] [0.106] [0.143]
EU-15/EFTA 1st gen — long (>10 years) 1.372 1.320 1.409 1.333 1.470
[0.299] [0.281] [0.376] [0.271] [0.429]
EU-15/EFTA 1st gen — recent (≤10 years) 0.982 1.464 0.551*** 0.887 1.144
[0.183] [0.401] [0.0957] [0.208] [0.247]
Constant 0 0.707* 1.941*** 0*** 0***
[0] [0.144] [0.380] [0] [0]
Controls
Year Yes No No Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes No No
Age, degree of urbanisation, cohabiting and Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dependent children
Number of observations 56,514 27,022 29,491 27,576 28,935
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; only high-skilled migrants aged 16–64, not in education/training or retired. Weighted and
clustered by region; the category “Eastern Europeans second generation” is omitted given its small size.
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